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CASE NOTES
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-DEFECTIVE DESIGN-DUTY OF
A MANUFACTURER WHEN PRODUCT'S USE IS
FORESEEABLE THOUGH UNINTENDED
Roy Evans, while driving his 1961 Chevrolet station wagon, was struck
broadside by another car. The resulting impact collapsed the side of the
automobile thereby killing Evans. A wrongful death action was com-
menced based on negligence, strict liability and warranty,1 against General
Motors, the company that designed and manufactured the automobile
that Evans was driving. It was shown that decedent's automobile did not
have the standard type of frame used in most other cars, known as a box
frame, but rather used an "X" frame. Plaintiff contended that the use of an
"X" frame did not adequately protect the driver against accidents of the
type herein involved, as there were no side rails on the frame. The District
Court dismissed the action on defendant's motion and the plaintiff
appealed. The United States Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
lower court, stating that General Motors had no duty to make its product
safe for any unintended use. The court further stated that "[t]he intended
purpose of an automobile does not include its participation in collisions
with other objects, despite the manufacturer's ability to foresee the possi-
bility that such collisions may occur.' 2 Evans v. General Motors Corp.
359 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1966).
The court, in the case at bar, does not specifically state the duty of a
manufacturer, but implies that it is merely to make a product safe for its
intended use. However, Judge Kiley, in the dissenting opinion, argues that
the duty also includes the requirement that a product be safe for uses
which are expected and foreseeable, even if not within the intended use of
the manufacturer. This note will examine the manufacturer's common-
law duty to the consumer in relation to injuries which may arise out of a
design defect in the product.
The Restatement of Torts discusses a manufacturer's duty in Section
398, where it states there is a duty to design safely for "the uses for which
it [the product] is manufactured." Section 3954 of the Restatement, al-
1 The court in this case discounted the strict liability and warranty aspects of this
action and proceeded to render its decision upon the theory of negligence. Consequent-
ly, this case note will concentrate only upon that area of negligence law discussed in the
court's opinion.
2Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 823, 825 (7th Cir. 1966).
8 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS S 398 (1965).
4 "A manufacturer who fails to exercise reasonable care in the manufacture of a chat-
tel which, unless carefully made, he should recognize as involving an unreasonable risk
of causing physical harm to those who use it for a purpose for which the manufacturer
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though not dealing with the design and planning aspects of a product, sets
out the same duty with respect to manufacturing. The court, in the Evans
case, impliedly utilized this standard. The comments following Section 395
provide a better explanation of the nature and scope of a manufacturer's
duty. Section 395 comment c states:
In order that the manufacturer of a chattel shall be subject to liability under
the rule stated in this section, it is not necessary that the chattel be one the
use of which is intended to affect, preserve, or destroy human life. The pur-
pose which the article, if perfect is intended to accomplish is immaterial. The
important thing is the harm which it is likely to do if it is imperfect.6
Comment j goes on to state:
The liability stated in this section is limited to persons who are endangered
and the risks which are created in the course of uses of the chattel which the
manufacturer should reasonably anticipate. In the absence of special reason
to expect otherwise, the maker is entitled to assume that his product will be
put to a normal use, for which the product is intended or appropriate; and
he is not subject to liability when it is safe for all such uses and harm results
only because it is mishandled in a way which he has no reason to expect, or
is used in some unusual or unforeseeable manner.6
It can readily be seen that comment j does not limit the manufacturer's
liability to injuries resulting from only intended use. Thus the Restate-
ment of Torts takes into account that forseeable unintended uses of the
product may be dangerous. In such a situation the Restatement places a
duty on the manufacturer to warn of the pending peril or to use other
reasonable means to guard against such danger. The proposition set forth
by the Restatement appears to be supported by case law.
As early as 1927, in the case of Davlin v. Henry Ford,7 the United
States Court of Appeals held that a manufacturer had a duty ". . . to use
reasonable care in employing designs, selecting materials, and making
assemblies, in the construction of a tractor which would fairly meet any
emergency of use which could reasonably be anticipated. ' 8 This reasoning
was adopted by the Supreme Court of Washington in Reusch v. Ford
Motor Co.9 In this case the plaintiff's truck became mired in mud. In
an attempt to remove the truck the engine was strained, causing sparks
should expect it to be used and to those whom he should expect to be endangered by
its probable use, is subject to liability for physical harm caused to them by its lawful use
in a manner and for a purpose for which it is supplied." RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS
S 395 (1965).
5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS S 395, comment c at 327 (1965).
6 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS 5 395, comment j at 330 (1965).
720 F.2d 317 (6th Cir. 127).
81d. at 319. 9 196 Wash. 213, 82 P.2d 556 (1938).
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to be generated, which ignited the gasoline. Even though the plaintiff
failed to recover due to lack of evidence, the court employed the rule in
Davlin as a controlling standard which a manufacturer must follow.
In recent years there has been a trend toward holding manufacturers
liable for failure to give warning of danger that may arise when a prod-
uct is put to a foreseeable though unintended use. In Haberly v. The
Reardon Company,'0 plaintiff, a 12 year old boy, lost the sight of his eye.
The injury resulted from plaintiff's father accidentally striking the child's
eye with a paint brush with defendant's lye base paint on it. The court
held the defendant had a duty to warn the purchaser of the danger, even
though the foreseeable injury was beyond the intended use of the product.
The decision in Spruill v. Boyle-Midway Inc."' also provides a clear
definition of a manufacturer's duty. In Spruill, the plaintiff's 14 month old
infant died when he swallowed a small amount of red furniture polish.
A decisive issue was whether or not plaintiff's use of the product was
foreseeable. Here again the use of the product was beyond that intended
by the manufacturer. The court settled the matter by stating:
Intended purpose is but a convenient adaptation of the basic test of 'reason-
able foreseeability' framed to more specifically fit the factual situations out of
which arise questions of a manufacturer's liability for negligence. . . . [H]e
(the manufacturer) must also be expected to anticipate the environment which
is normal for the use of his product.' 2
One of the leading treatises on this subject 18 reiterates the view adopted
by many courts and the Restatement of Torts. They state that:
The maker of goods is bound to foresee and guard against only unreasonable
risks which result from some use of the product which a reasonable manu-
facturer would anticipate as likely enough to be taken into account.
14
Not only do they offer an example which directly applies to the Evans
case, but the example also illustrates the foreseeability of an automobile
accident. "Automobiles will almost surely be driven, sometimes at high
speed, and often where other vehicles and pedestrians are present."' 5 Ford
Motor Company v. Zahn'0 directly supports this premise. The plaintiff
was injured while riding in an automobile which made a sudden stop to
avoid an accident. The thrust of the stop caused the plaintiff to be thrown
10 319 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1958).
11308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962). 12 Id. at 83.
13 2 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF ToRTs (1956).
14 2 HARPER & JAMES, op. cit. supra note 13, § 28.3.
15 2 HARPER & JAMES, op. cit. supra note 13, § 28.6.
10265 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1959); accord. Roberts v. United States, 316 F.2d 489 (3d
Cir. 1963); Bird v. Ford Motor Co., 15 F.Supp. 590 (D.N.Y. 1936); Eitchen v. Central
Minnesota Power Cooperative Assn., 224 Minn. 180, 28 N.W.2d 862 (1947).
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against the dashboard resulting in severe injury to his eye. The court held
that itwas a foreseeable risk that automobiles may crash. Statistics further
illustrate this point. The data of the National Safety Council show that
there is one motor vehicle death every eleven minutes and the equivalent
of one injury every nineteen seconds. In 1964 there was a total of 47,000
deaths caused by motor vehicles. In fact in Illinois alone, there were 2,207
traffic deaths in 1964.17
The duty required of a manufacturer involves reasonable care to guard
against foreseeable though unintended uses. It extends to those areas of
peril, such as an automobile accident, that a manufacturer can readily fore-
see and anticipate. Once this has been established with respect to the
manufacture of a product it must necessarily follow there is a correlative
duty to prevent design defects.
The Restatement of Torts and case law hold that a manufacturer must
employ due care in the designing (or planning stage) of a product. The
defect alleged in the Evans case arose at the planning stage and not at the
building stage.
Negligent construction is carelessness in the actual building of a thing, such
for example, as neglecting to put proper bracing in the wings of an airplane,
or putting improper material or something of the sort.'8
Improper or negligent design involves improper planning or a fault arising
at the drawing board stage:
A manufacturer of a chattel made under a plan or design which makes it dan-
gerous for the uses for which it is manufactured is subject to liability to others
whom he should expect to use the chattel or to be endangered by its probable
use for physical harm caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the
adoption of a safe plan or design.1
Comment j of Section 395 of the Restatement of Torts20 requires that a
manufacturer must use due care in the design or plan of a product in
order to avoid injury to the consumer. The majority of American juris-
dictions support this idea, 21 and liability has been found for various types
of design defects on many different items.
The Court, in Carpini v. Pittsburgh & Weirton Bus Company22 found
a manufacturer liable for the negligent design of pet-cocks that controlled
17 NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 1965 Edition, 40, 41 (1965).
's Maynard v. Stinson Aircraft, 1940 U.S. Av. 71, 83.
19 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS S 398, at 336 (1965).
20 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 395, comment f at 328 (1965).
21 AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 2:59-2:69 (Hursh ed. 1961). See also,
Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 91 (1961).
22216 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1954).
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the air brake system of a bus. The pet-cock was designed to suspend from
the frame of the bus. When the bus was fully loaded, the pet-cock was
very close to the ground. The bus struck an object on the road which
sheared off the pet-cock and caused the vehicle to crash. Liability was
found despite the fact that the design had never before caused an accident.
The Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Company23 was brought to trial for
its negligent design of a compressed air tank. The new design was for a
cylindrical tank instead of the usual spherical shape. When compressed
gas was injected into the tank it exploded killing the plaintiff. Negligent
design was a prime issue and the defendant was held liable. As early as
1927 the United States Court of Appeals24 said that a manufacturer's
". .. duty was to use reasonable care in employing designs, selecting
materials and making assemblies . ,,21 Product design may thus lead to
liability in negligence, that is, if the design is defective and if the defect
leads to injury. Moreover, as pointed out above, liability is found even
though the injury was caused while the product was being put to an
unintended but foreseeable use.26
In the instant case, Campo v. Scofield2 7 is cited to support the position
that the product need only be fit for its intended purpose. This case which
the court adopted does not necessarily apply to the situation in the case
at hand. In Campo, the court was faced with a situation where a worker
put his hand in a machine used to shear off the tops of onions. The machine
was obviously dangerous. The court stated that there is no liability on
the part of a manufacturer if a person using the machine is aware of the
risk and assumes it. This was not the factual situation in the Evans case.
It is not disputed that a manufacturer can foresee the possibility that one
can cut his finger on a knife, but that is a danger that can be perceived
by all, and steps can be taken to avoid the cut.
A defect in the design of an automobile is of another nature. The defect
is latent, the driver knows he may get into a collision and so does the
manufacturer. However, the manufacturer is the only one who can fore-
see that the side of the car may collapse upon impact because it was
designed with an "X" frame.
23 Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel, 183 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1950).
24 Davlin v. Henry Ford, supra note 7.
25 Id. at 319.
26 Accord: Goullon v. Ford Motor Co., 44 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1930); Northwest
Airlines v. Glenn L. Martin, 224 F.2d 120 (6th Cir. 1955); United States Radiator v.
Henderson, 68 F.2d 87 (10th Cir. 1933); Noel v. United States Aircraft, 342 F.2d 232
(D. Del. 1963); Brooks v. Allis Chalmers, 163 Cal. App. 20, 329 P.2d 575 (1958);
Lovejoy v. Minneapolis-Moline Power Implement Co., 248 Minn. 319, 79 N.W.2d 688
(1956).
27 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950).
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In conclusion the court could have easily found that the dissent, as
stated by Judge Kiley, exemplifies the current trend. But, whether or not
the majority of American jurisdictions will adopt this view remains a
matter of conjecture.
Philip Wolin
ZONING-AUTHORITY OF MUNICIPALITY
TO DEFINE FAMILY
The owner of a house located in a single-family residence district leased
the premises to four unrelated young men. Claiming that the dwelling was
not being used as a single-family residence within the meaning of its zon-
ing ordinance, the city of Des Plaines brought suit to enjoin occupancy
by the lessees. The injunction was granted by the circuit court, holding
that the lessees did not constitute a family within the meaning of the
Des Plaines zoning ordinance. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Illinois
reversed, finding that the enactment of a zoning ordinance which so de-
fined family as to prohibit the occupancy of this dwelling by four un-
related men was beyond the authority delegated to the city by the Illinois
General Assembly's enabling statute.' City of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34
I11. 2d 432, 216 N.E.2d 116 (1966).
The need for zoning has been recognized since early Roman Law,2 and
as it exists today, "It consists of a general plan to control and direct the
use and development of property in a municipality or a large part of it by
dividing it into districts according to the present and potential use of the
properties." 3 While single-family residence zoning is a familiar, perhaps
universal characteristic of zoning ordinances, questions relating to the
precise definition of the word "family" have not been involved in Illinois
zoning decisions.4 Although various criteria have been employed by Illi-
nois municipalities to define family in their zoning ordinances,5 the Trott-
I ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 24, S 11-13-1 (1965).
2 YOKLay Yoiaay, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE, § 1-3 (3rd ed. 1965).
3 State v. Huntington, 145 Conn. 394, 399, 143 A.2d 444, 447 (1958). Reaffirming the
definition in the text as it first appeared in Miller v. Town Planning Commission,
142 Conn. 265, 269, 113 A.2d 504, 505 (1956).
4 City of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34 111. 2d 432, 216 N.E.2d 116 (1966).
5 Section I of the Rockford, Illinois zoning ordinance defines a family as follows:
"Any number of individuals living and cooking together on the premises as a single
housekeeping unit." Similar definitions appear in the zoning ordinances of Ottawa,
Quincy, Wilmette and Skokie, Illinois. In contrast, the ordinances of Winnetka and
Oak Park define a family as a group of individuals "related by blood or marriage."
Maywood, Illinois Zoning Ordinance, Art. 11, S 2(15) (1952) permits a family to
consist of unrelated persons, but in no event, in such a case, shall the group be more
